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There is no Final Judgment in the Fredericks9 Action Because Nipper Still 
Has Unadjudicated Claims Against Other Parties to that Action 
Douglas argues in various parts of his Brief that Nipper failed to "analyze" 
or properly "explain" what Nipper meant by the statement that there is no "final 
judgment" in the Fredericks' Case. Douglas goes on to say that there is a "firm" 
order relating to Nipper's claims against Douglas, so there must be a "final order." 
This analysis is not based in any Utah law. Douglas admits that the orders 
granting summary judgment to Douglas on Nipper's pierce the corporate veil/alter 
ego claims have not been certified under Rule 54 for appeal, and that there remain 
outstanding issues in the Fredericks Action against other parties such that nothing 
in that case can be appealed at this point in time. 
Until there is a "final judgment" as to all claims and parties in the 
Fredericks' Action, it cannot be appealed and it is still possible that Judge 
Fredericks could modify any and all of his rulings therein. It is because of this 
latter fact - that Judge Fredericks' rulings are not yet final, but could be changed 
by him - that res judicata cannot apply to the claims in the Noel (Rico) Action. 
Nipper has not failed to properly analyze this issue. Nipper has cited the 
correct case law. Nipper has analyzed it and demonstrated that if there is no "final 
judgment" in the Fredericks' case, then there can be no res judicata. And, Nipper 
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has correctly represented the true fact that there is no "final judgment" in the 
Fredericks' case. 
Douglas cites a series of cases, Press Pubk Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Intern., 
Ltd.. 37 . 3d 1121 (Utah 2001). D'Aston v. Aston. 844 p. 2d 345 (Utah App. 
1992); Berry v. Berry. 738 p. 2d 246 (Utah App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and 
Loan y. Bruno. 735 p. 2d 387 (Utah App. 1987); but they are all distinguishable 
from this case because the Appellate Courts in each instance found that the ruling 
in those cases had in fact been final and no longer appealable. 
Douglas then cites a case from Washington, Cunningham y. State. 811 p. 2d 
225 (Wash. App. 1991), for the proposition that there does not have to be Rule 
54(b) certification for an order to be "final" for res judicata purposes. There are 
no Utah cases on point supporting Douglas5 position. 
Consequently, Nipper's argument is not without merit under the current 
state of Utah law. 
Nipper can understand a desire to hold that Fredericks' "firm" decision 
deciding that Douglas has "no personal liability" based upon Nipper's pierce the 
corporate veil/ alter ego theories should be res judicata on that specific issue in the 
Noel Action. Judge Fredericks did rule that the corporate shield does protect 
Douglas. But that is all that Fredericks addressed. That is all that Fredericks ruled 
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on. 
The other theories for relief- RICO and the like - were not previously 
raised in any forum, and there is no "firm" decision by Fredericks on these issues. 
Douglas did not argue in his motion for summary judgment before Fredericks that 
Douglas was not a "conspirator." Nipper argued that there was no corporate veil 
because Remember When was dissolved at all relevant times, and Douglas argued 
to the contrary. Douglas argued only that the corporate veil protected him. 
The Conspiracy Claims have never been briefed and ruled upon. Judge 
Fredericks just put broad language in his ruling - "no personal liability." The 
RICO claims were never raised at all. They have not been litigated. They have 
not been ruled on. But, they have now been dismissed. Why? Because Judge 
Noel found that they "could have," and "should have," been brought in the 
Fredericks Action. 
That ruling is simply not fair under these circumstances. These claims 
should not have been dismissed by Noel. They were not in fact raised in the 
Fredericks Action, and "could [not] have been" raised therein because Nipper was 
not aware of the facts necessary to raise them in his original Fredericks complaint. 
Under Macris, Nipper is not required to amend the first action to bring later 
discovered claims for relief based upon later discovered facts. 
3 
There is No Evidence that Nipper Knew of the Ludwigs5 Claims, or that 
Douglas/Nichols/Gent had Defrauded at Least Five Other Customers, at the 
Time that Nipper Filed His Complaint in the Fredericks5 Action 
With respect to the "did not know" and/or "different facts'Vclaims" 
analysis, Nipper's position is simple: 
a. At the time that Nipper filed his complaint in the Fredericks Action, 
Nipper only knew that he had been lied to and lost his car; 
b. Nipper did not know: 
i. That the Ludwigs were the purchasers and had also been lied 
to; or 
ii. That there were at least five other customers who had also been 
lied to and/or defrauded; 
c. Even if Nipper had known, Nipper's Fredericks Action complaint 
does not contain any RICO claims, nor does it contain any of the 
Ludwigs' claims. These are new and different claims/theories for 
relief. 
Under the Macris case, as extensively quoted by Nipper, Nipper was under 
no obligation to include these causes of action in his first complaint in the 
Fredericks Action. 
The complaint in the Fredericks Action does have some facts that are the 
same as those pled in the RICO complaint filed in the Noel Action (i.e., the factual 
allegations about what Nipper did and how Remember When and the others 
obtained and then improperly disposed of Nipper's own car). But the First 
Complaint does not contain any allegations about the Ludwigs' separate claims, or 
about the wrongful conduct with respect to the five or so other customers who 
were also defrauded. These are "different facts." The Ludwig facts are different 
than the Nipper facts. The facts relating to the defrauding of the five or so other 
customers are different facts than the Nipper facts. The allegations of the pattern 
of racketeering are clearly "different" from those in the straight forward Nipper 
breach of contract, fraud case. The RICO complaint alleges many more facts and 
a clearly "different" factual pattern. 
Based on what Nipper knew when he filed his first complaint, he could not 
make any allegations about the Ludwigs, or the other customers. He did not know 
about them. There is no evidence anywhere in the record that he did know about 
them. The burden was on Douglas to show that Nipper's claims could have been 
brought in the Fredericks Action. Douglas did not meet that burden. Nipper's 
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claims should not have been dismissed without a showing that Nipper lmew about 
and could have filed the RICO claims. 
Douglas Admits that the Ludwigs Were Never Parties to the Fredericks' 
Action, but Then Incorrectly Asserts that they are in Privity With the Nippers 
Douglas admits on page 9 of his brief that he "does not deny, and never has 
denied [sic] the Ludwigs were not parties to the Frederick Action." Douglas then 
goes on to claim that the "Sandy Case'5 is now justification for res judicata as to 
the Ludwigs' claims against Douglas. This was not cited by Judge Noel as any 
basis for his ruling, nor did Douglas refer in any of his motions to the Sandy Case. 
The Sandy Case was filed by the Ludwigs. It was brought against Douglas, 
Remember When, Nipper (to force him to turn over the title), and Remember 
When's bonding company, Western Surety. Nipper answered and cross-claimed 
against Douglas. Westem Surety interpled the proceeds of their bond and sued all 
entities that it was aware of that had claims against the bond. It was this case that 
gave Nipper knowledge of the facts with respect to the Ludwigs and that other 
customers claimed to have been defrauded. 
There are no judgments in favor of Douglas in the Sandy Case. Once 
Nipper, the Ludwigs, the other defrauded customers and Western Surety settled 
their claims against one another and divided up the bond company's money, that 
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case has basically sat dormant. 
The RICO claims needed to be raised somewhere, and involved many more 
defendants than the Fredericks Action. Nipper did not want to bring them in the 
Sandy Action because the other defrauded customers were parties to that action 
and Nipper did not want them to jump on Nipper's band wagon and try and obtain 
a share of any recovery which Nipper obtained on his and the Ludwigs' RICO 
claims. 
The Fredericks Action had pretty much been resolved as to the issues 
therein. Remember When was liable to Nipper for the car. Douglas was not 
personally liable under a pierce the corporate veil/ alter ego theory (and probably 
not Nichols either). So, that case was essentially resolved as to the issues therein 
and was not going any where. 
Nipper filed the new RICO complaint as a separate lawsuit because he did 
not believe that any thing in the Sandy Action or the Fredericks Action precluded 
Nipper from doing so. Neither of those Courts have ruled on any RICO claims. 
Those claims are not pled before either of those Courts. Further, no ruling in 
either the Sandy Action or the Fredericks Action precludes a finding that Douglas, 
Nichols, Michael Gent and others joined together to form a racketeering 
enterprise, and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity (the defrauding of 
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Nipper, the Ludwigs and the five or so other customers). The only thing that 
Fredericks ruled on is that the corporate veil shields Douglas from liability for acts 
of the corporation. 
It is not duplicative to proceed in the Noel Action with the RICO and 
Conspiracy Claims - or with the Ludwig Claims. 
Douglas Did Not Meet His Burden of Showing That the Ludwigs are Privies 
of Nipper — The Facts Relating to The Ludwigs5 Interaction with Remember 
When and Douglas are Different and Distinct From the Facts Relating to 
Nipper 
Douglas argues that the Ludwigs are in fact privies with Nipper simply 
because they both seek to recover from Remember When and Douglas. The 
problem with this assertion is that Douglas has not shown that the facts relating to 
the fraud on Ludwig are essentially identical to those relating to the fraud on 
Nipper. The Ludwigs had entirely different contacts and communications with 
Remember When and Douglas. There was no showing before Judge Noel that the 
fact situations were sufficiently similar that they should be found to be privies. 
Douglas had the burden of proving that they were privies. On the record 
before Judge Noel and as outlined by Douglas, there is no evidence that the 
Ludwig were in fact privies - even with respect to the pierce the corporate veil 
claims. This is because Douglas' conduct with respect to the Ludwigs, as opposed 
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to his conduct with respect to Nipper, may have been sufficient to demonstrate that 
the veil should in fact have been pierced by the Ludwigs and against Douglas. 
This is a factually intensive issue that was not dealt with at all by Douglas or Noel. 
Although Correct that Brian Steffensen's Name Was on the Pleadings of the 
Complaints in Both the Fredericks and the Noel Actions - William Middleton 
Was The Attorney That In Fact Was Handling the Initial Motions in the Noel 
Matter 
William Middleton was the attorney who handled and argued the initial 
motions in the Noel Action. Brian Steffensen handled the motion to reconsider 
before Judge Noel and now this appeal. 
It is Simply Unfair and Inequitable for Douglas to Escape his Admitted 
Personal Liability to Nipper - Equity Demands that Nipper be Given a 
Remedy Against Douglas for Douglas' Now Admitted Wrongful Conduct 
Nipper really is astounded that Judge Fredericks ruled that a dissolved 
limited liability company could shield Douglas from personal liability for his then 
sole proprietorship - Remember When. Nipper did go back to Judge Fredericks 
more than once to try and get a better idea as to why Judge Fredericks felt like a 
non-existent limited liability company, and not Douglas, should be liable to 
Nipper. 
However, Judge Frederick did so rule - and that ruling has not yet been 
appealed. 
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But, it is now absolutely crystal clear that: 
a. Nipper was defrauded; 
b. The Ludwigs were defrauded; 
c. Five other customers were defrauded; 
d. Douglas pled guilty - personally - to his criminal involvement in 
these frauds; 
e. Douglas5 cohort, Michael Gent, also pled guilty to this same criminal 
behavior; 
f. Douglas5 other cohort - Richard Nichols - was found guilty of his role 
in these crimes after a trial; 
g. Douglas agreed to pay criminal restitution to Nipper as part of his 
plea agreement; 
h. Douglas has yet to pay Nipper a single dime for the tens of thousands 
of dollars in damages that Nipper has sustained at Douglas5 
ADMITTED HANDS. 
All of which begs the fundamental question: WHEN WILL NIPPER GET 
JUSTICE? Douglas claims that he has some how been damaged by Nipper's 
attempts to obtain recovery from Douglas. How can Douglas claim this? Douglas 
admitted that he wronged Nipper, and agreed as a part of his plea to pay criminal 
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restitution to Nipper! 
Furthermore, how can Douglas claim in good faith that he should be paid 
his attorney's fees? With Douglas' GUILTY PLEA, why should it not be clear 
that it is Nipper who should be reimbursed for his attorneys' fees? 
With Douglas' guilty plea of record, it has been wholly disingenuous and 
wrong for Douglas to continue to assert - before Judge Noel, and now before this 
Court - that Douglas should not pay Nipper the money that Douglas agreed in his 
plea agreement to pay Nipper. 
Douglas, Gent and Nichols must be held accountable for their wrongdoing. 
They have admitted their wrongdoing - or been found guilty of it. Justice must 
somehow be done. Nipper must be given a remedy and means of obtaining relief. 
Given Douglas' subsequent guilty plea and agreement to pay Nipper criminal 
restitution, Judge Fredericks' ruling that Douglas "has no personal liability" under 
the pierce the corporate veil/ alter ego claims (when the facts about Douglas' 
criminal complicity were not before him) should not bar Nipper's claims. 
If this Court feels like these claims must be brought before Judge 
Fredericks, then this Court should order that Judge Noel's dismissal should be 
without prejudice, and direct that these claims be joined in the Fredericks Action. 
The Fredericks Action remains open with no final judgment. At the very least, 
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Nipper should be allowed to bring his clearly meritorious claims in that action if 
they cannot properly be brought in the Noel Action. 
Nipper lost his car. 
Nipper had to pay money to the Ludwigs to resolve things with them. 
Nipper has had to pay tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees. 
And - THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT DOUGLAS should be held liable 
to Nipper and the Ludwigs based upon Douglas' guilty pleas and the order of 
restitution. 
Nipper simply asks this Court to see that justice is done. Douglas is hiding 
improperly behind a very suspect "corporate shield." On this record, that 
corporate shield should not act to shelter Douglas from liability for his admitted 
criminal fraud against Nipper and the Ludwigs. 
Justice can only be done by Granting the Following Relief: 
1. Reversing Judge Noel and allowing these claims based upon the new 
facts to proceed in that Court; or 
2. Directing that these claims be consolidated in the Fredericks Action; 
and 
3. Reversing the grant of attorneys' fees. 
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of September, 2003. 
Steffensen ••• Law ••• Office 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1^1 day of J />f- , ZOO?
 91 caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be fc mailed, postage prepaid; and/or hand-
delivered by fax and/or by courier; addressed to: 
Preston S. Howell 
3386 Ramsey Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
13 
